Real peace requires a secure Israel

Wall Street Journal, March 27, 2000
Opinion piece by Ariel Sharon, chairman of Israel's Likud Party

President Clinton yesterday met with Syrian leader Hafez Assad in hopes of jump-starting stalled peace talks between Israel and Syria.
Whatever the outcome, Clinton and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak face one clear deadline: the U.S. presidential campaign.

According to Clinton and Barak, the peace package is nearly a done deal: Syria will "allow" Israel to withdraw its troops safely from Lebanon, while Israel will agree to a complete withdrawal from the strategic cliffs of the Golan Heights to the vulnerable shores of the Sea of Galilee, and to concede El Hamma - an area that never belonged to Syria.

It is Assad who is in no hurry. He knows that with patience he can squeeze more concessions. Future historians will be left to explain how an ailing president of an impoverished Syria was able to dictate the national-security interests of Israel and the Jewish people.

Does Assad really want peace? As Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar'a explained, an agreement with Israel is a temporary phase marking the continuation of war with Israel by other means. Assad and the future Syrian leadership reject the term "normalization."

Lebanon is a good example of Syria's intentions. Assad knows that Israel's planned July withdrawal will disrupt the Syrian game plan, undermining its grip on Lebanon and freeing Israel from additional concessions on the Golan. So Syria is already preparing for the next round, as expressed in the resolutions of the recent Arab League summit in Beirut.
This includes continued terrorist attacks inside Israel and abroad as well as armed struggle until Palestinian refugees in Lebanon secure a right of return and East Jerusalem is put back in Arab hands.
Syria was not required as part of a peace agreement to withdraw its forces completely from Lebanon.

Nor was any demand made that in return for Israel's conceding defensive assets - the Golan - Syria would reduce the size of its military forces and its arsenal.
Syria, in fact, was not expected to make any painful compromises for peace. Yet Israel's friends on Capitol Hill and leaders of Jewish organizations were mobilized by the Clinton and Barak peace teams to lobby Congress for a generous financial aid package to Syria. Some advocates of this aid, designed to ease Syria's shift to a U.S. strategic embrace, compare it to the Marshall Plan.

A Marshall Plan for the Middle East is a good idea, provided it includes the types of conditions that were present in the original plan for Europe. The Marshall Plan was predicated on a gradual move toward democracy through social and economic reforms. In addition, there were inspection measures to prevent the emergence of a new Mussolini or Hitler.
In order to serve the cause of comprehensive peace as well as U.S. interests in the Middle East, such a program must incorporate the following elements:

• Joint deterrence. Israel must retain control of the commanding grounds of the Golan Heights, even after peace with Syria. In fact, there must be a clear link between its final border with Syria and an overall move toward normalization, security and reconciliation with Israeli's entire eastern front (Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Jordan).
  It is untenable for Israel to undertake the risk of withdrawal just as threats from Iraq and Iran intensify. Large Iraqi forces fought on the Golan in the 1973 war, while Iran remains a key strategic partner of Syria. The U.S. and the international community should renew the United Nations weapons-inspection regime in Iraq and step up efforts to halt Iran's nuclear and missile programs.

• Denial of direct financial or military aid. No weapons and no direct financial assistance should go to Damascus. An effective economic-aid program must be based on direct private investment in the Syrian civilian economy, giving Syrian leaders and people something to lose and thus a stake in peace.
  The $2 billion of financial aid Syria received for its passive participation in the Gulf War went to purchasing hundreds of top-of-the-line tanks and artillery. If Syria replaces its aging MiGs with F-16s, what have we accomplished? The rearming of Syria with advanced Western weapons would threaten not just Israel but also Jordan and Turkey.

• Long-term security agreements. Whatever aid program is provided, the territorial concessions demanded of Israel must extend over long periods of time (similar to the Okinawa arrangements the U.S. had with Japan after World War II).
  This would enable both Israel and the U.S. to assess progress toward real comprehensive regional peace based on democratic reforms, economic cooperation and an end to official incitement, and all forms of terrorism. Throughout and after this period, Israel must be able to defend itself using it own military and strategic capabilities. Neither expensive American technology nor U.S. troop deployment is a substitute for Israel's own independent capability.

Finally, a word of caution regarding long-term financial aid to Arab countries. What the Middle East needs is a program of support and incentives for private investment that will broaden its economies. Experts are anticipating a decline in the use of Middle East oil in the next 10 to 15 years, which could severely damage existing economies.
In this scenario, Israel will remain an island of stability and economic growth amid the surrounding dislocation. But the prosperity and development of the entire region is an Israeli interest.
U.S. presidents have their eyes on short-term, election deadlines.

But Israel must look at the long term. More important than any deadline is the survival and destiny of its people.

The rest, with all due respect, can wait.