How to stop terrorism

By Benjamin Netanyahu
Maariv, June 3, 2001

The horrible murders of the last few days are tearing at the hearts of the whole nation, and causing a feeling of no way out for some of us. We are being told that terrorism cannot be stopped at all, and certainly not by military means.
I completely disagree with this statement. Terrorism can be stopped only by rehabilitating Israel's power of deterrence and the willingness to employ it when needed.

We stopped the terrorism from Egypt and Jordan using military means, many years before there were any sort of diplomatic processes with them. But there is no need to look back decades. In the three years of my government's tenure, we took terrorism off the national agenda. In 1996 we were elected to stop the wave of buses exploding and suicide bombers. In the 1999 elections, the security issue was no longer on the table. After three years that were nearly completely quiet and safe, I handed over to my successor a tranquil country whose citizens had a sense of security.

Arafat is the same Arafat, Hamas is the same Hamas, and the suicide bombers are the same suicide bombers. What has changed?

During my government's tenure, we rehabilitated Israel's power of deterrence, and would not accept terrorism as part of our daily routine.

Following our firm reaction to the events of the Hasmonean Tunnel and the three terrorist attacks in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, Arafat understood three things:

1. That I am prepared to use the IDF's full force against the Palestinian Authority, even to the extent of toppling it.

2. That the ministers supported this policy.

3. That the government I headed would employ this policy despite all the international pressure.

Understanding the threat from us to his regime caused Arafat to take action against the Islamic terrorist organizations and to lock up terrorists. After the 1999 elections, Israel's policy was changed utterly and completely.
The government that replaced mine returned to the policy of the Oslo government: it expressed a willingness for excessive concessions to the Palestinians, including under fire (and even hurriedly withdrew from Lebanon). As in the days of Oslo, the result was the same: a wave of terror once again engulfed the country.

In order to bring the power of deterrence back to Israel, we have to once again insist on three things:

1. Israel is prepared to use any power necessary to stop the terror, including to the extent of paralyzing the Palestinian Authority and causing its collapse. Arafat is not worried about his people, upon whom he has brought one disaster after another, but he is certainly worried about his continued rule.

2. The government must stand together behind this policy, which the majority of the people support.

3. Israel will explain to international public opinion that we are implementing the natural right of any country to defend its citizens. This PR campaign is ever so much simpler with the present American administration, and with a coordinated diplomatic-PR effort, it will succeed.

These steps will bring about a halt to terror, and perhaps even before the Palestinian Authority collapses. But should Arafat not understand this, his successors will surely have learnt the lesson. In order to survive in power they will have to stop the terrorism against us.

The key to stopping the terror is not in the identity of the regime facing us or its intentions, but in deterrence.
Arafat will not forsake the ideology of destroying Israel, which was once again exposed at Camp David. But he, or his successor, will stop the terrorism when they are forced to choose between it and the continuation of their rule.
Ghadaffi is the same Ghadaffi, but he forsook terrorism when the U.S. bombed Libya and imposed heavy sanctions on it.
North Korea is the same North Korea, but it too has moved away from using terrorism as a result of the incredible economic and international damage that terrorism had caused it.

The conception of Oslo, which is that relations of peace with the Palestinian can be established based on the assumption that they had altered their intentions towards Israel, was mistaken.
In its place, the concept of security which has served Israel since its establishment, which brought about the cessation of fighting with two of our neighbors, and which ultimately enabled the establishing of peaceful relations with them, must be brought back: a strong Israel which knows how to stand up for itself and is prepared to use its power when necessary.