By Richard N. Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations and the
author of "War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars"
(Simon & Schuster, 2009).
Wall Street Journal Opinion, April 26, 2010.
Announcing a comprehensive plan now - one that is all but certain to fail - risks
discrediting good ideas, breeding frustration in the Arab world, and diluting
America's reputation for getting things done.
President Obama recently said it was a "vital national security interest of the
United States" to resolve the Middle East conflict. Last month, David Petraeus,
the general who leads U.S. Central Command, testified before Congress that
"enduring hostilities between Israel and some of its neighbors present distinct
challenges to our ability to advance our interests." He went on to say that
"Arab anger over the Palestinian question limits the strength and depth of U.S.
partnerships with governments and peoples . . . and weakens the legitimacy of
moderate regimes in the Arab world."
To be sure, peace between Israelis and Palestinians would be of real value. It
would constitute a major foreign-policy accomplishment for the United States. It
would help ensure Israel's survival as a democratic, secure, prosperous, Jewish
state. It would reduce Palestinian and Arab alienation, a source of
anti-Americanism and radicalism. And it would dilute the appeal of Iran and its
clients.
But it is easy to exaggerate how central the Israel-Palestinian issue is and how
much the U.S. pays for the current state of affairs. There are times one could
be forgiven for thinking that solving the Palestinian problem would take care of
every global challenge from climate change to the flu. But would it?
The short answer is no. It matters, but both less and in a different way
than people tend to think.
Take Iraq, the biggest American investment in the Greater Middle East over the
past decade. That country's Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds are divided over the
composition of the new government, how to share oil revenues, and where to
draw the border between the Kurdish and Arab areas. The emergence of a
Palestinian state would not affect any of these power struggles.
Soon to surpass Iraq as the largest U.S. involvement in the region is
Afghanistan. Here the U.S. finds itself working against, as much as with, a
weak and corrupt president who frustrates American efforts to build up a
government that is both willing and able to take on the Taliban. Again, the
emergence of a Palestinian state would have no effect on prospects for U.S.
policy in Afghanistan or on Afghanistan itself.
What about Iran? The greatest concern is Iran's push for nuclear weapons. But
what motivates this pursuit is less a desire to offset Israel's nuclear weapons
than a fear of conventional military attack by the U.S. Iran's nuclear bid is also
closely tied to its desire for regional primacy. Peace between Israel and the
Palestinians would not weaken Iran's nuclear aspirations. It could even reinforce
them. Iran and the groups it backs (notably Hamas and Hezbollah) would be
sidelined by the region's embrace of a Palestinian state and acceptance of
Israel, perhaps causing Tehran to look to nuclear weapons to compensate for
its loss of standing and influence.
Nor is it clear what effect successful peacemaking would have on Arab
governments. The Palestinian impasse did nothing to dissuade Arab
governments from working with the U.S. to oust Saddam Hussein from Kuwait
in the Gulf War when they determined it was in their interest to do so.
Similarly, an absence of diplomatic progress would not preclude
collaboration against an aggressive Iran. Just as important, a solution would not
resolve questions of political stability and legitimacy within the largely
authoritarian Arab world.
Alas, neither would terrorism fade if Israelis and Palestinians finally ended their
conflict. Al Qaeda was initially motivated by a desire to rid the Arabian
Peninsula of infidels. Its larger goal is to spread Islam in a form that closely
resembles its pure, seventh-century character. Lip service is paid to Palestinian
goals, but the radical terrorist agenda would not be satisfied by Palestinian
statehood.
What is more, any Palestinian state would materialize only amidst compromise.
There will be no return to the 1967 borders; at most, Palestinians would be
compensated for territorial adjustments made necessary by large blocs of
Jewish settlements and Israeli security concerns. There will be nothing more
than a token right of return for Palestinians to Israel. Jerusalem will remain
undivided and at most shared.
Terrorists would see all this as a sell-out, and they would target not just Israel
but those Palestinians and Arab states who made peace with it.The danger of
exaggerating the benefits of solving the Palestinian conflict is that doing so runs
the risk of distorting American foreign policy. It accords the issue more
prominence than it deserves, produces impatience, and tempts the U.S.
government to adopt policies that are overly ambitious.
This is not an argument for ignoring the Palestinian issue. As is so often the
case, neglect will likely prove malign.
But those urging President Obama to announce a peace plan are doing
him and the cause of peace no favor. Announcing a comprehensive plan now -
one that is all but certain to fail - risks discrediting good ideas, breeding
frustration in the Arab world, and diluting America's reputation for getting
things done.
As Edgar noted in "King Lear," "Ripeness is all." And the situation in the Middle
East is anything but ripe for ambitious diplomacy. What is missing are not
ideas - the outlines of peace are well-known - but the will and ability to
compromise.
The Palestinian leadership remains weak and divided; the Israeli government is
too ideological and fractured; U.S.-Israeli relations are too strained for Israel to
place much faith in American promises. The West Bank is the equivalent of a
fragile state at best. What is needed are sustained efforts to strengthen
Palestinian economic, military and governing capacities on the West Bank so
that Israel will come to see the Palestinian Authority as a partner it can work
with.
Also needed are efforts to repair U.S.-Israeli ties. The most important issue
facing the two countries is Iran. It is essential the two governments develop a
modicum of trust if they are to manage inevitable differences over what to do
about Iran's nuclear program, a challenge that promises to be the most
significant strategic threat of this decade. A protracted disagreement over the
number of settlements or the contours of a final settlement is a distraction that
would benefit neither the U.S. nor Israel, given an Iranian threat that is close at
hand and a promise of peace that is distant.
